



A Presentation for Residences at sea.  
on  
**Maritime Terrorism Risk & Security Planning**

[info@uc-global.com](mailto:info@uc-global.com) - [www.uc-global.com](http://www.uc-global.com)





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## INTRODUCTION

- The maritime environment possesses unique characteristics that, in principle, make it attractive to terrorist operations, including the extraterritoriality of the high seas and inconsistent security measures in many parts of the world.
- Today's Salafi-Jihadists (see February VTR for detailed analysis of this group) are a "gray area phenomena" as they are diffuse in nature and unaffiliated with sovereign governments. They are well armed, highly mobile and extremely unpredictable.
- The maritime realm is particularly conducive to these types of threat contingencies, given its vast and largely unregulated nature (130 million square miles).
- Al-Shabab in Somalia (seafarer expertise) is now collaborating with ISIS in Libya (seaborne assets taken from Libyan oil concerns) to exploit the maritime realm in the Mediterranean (or the "Med") to facilitate terrorist logistical and operational missions. Hence the emergence of a new terrorist group with maritime capabilities whose goal is to terrorize, as opposed to Somali pirates whose goal was strictly commercial in nature.
- For the first time, a major terrorist organization such as ISIS has taken control of a coastal region and possesses the necessary means to extend their physical reach into Europe and anything and anyone that passes through the Mediterranean.
- We now believe that the next major terrorist attacks against Western interests is likely to come from the maritime realm. There are already major threats by ISIS against Rome.
- For shipping, the major consequences of an attack are loss of life and property damage.



## TODAY'S MEETING AGENDA

- An assessment of the risks associated with maritime terrorism, particularly the Med, in order to assist Cruise ship Owners/Management to calibrate and prioritize security measures, prevention efforts and its mitigation plans in such a way as to significantly minimize risks (including civil liabilities) from current terrorist threats in the most cost effective manner achieving maximum ROI in terms of maximizing risk mitigation.
- Using the information in this presentation to determine the type and consequential footprint of the most likely maritime strike in order to most effectively manage and mitigate the threat via a thorough understanding of current threats, vulnerabilities, consequences and relative likelihood of an attack. When taken together, these 4 pillars play a key role in defining and quantifying the exact nature of the terrorism risk the Ship faces for the purposes of structuring the most effective protective measures at the lowest possible cost. Proactive expenditures are a small fraction of reactionary costs.
- Today we will look at the potential direct (loss of life and property damage) and indirect (civil liability) damages and what direct action Management can take to immediately hedge against these attack based consequences through ongoing intelligence reports, strategic management of personnel, security training, changes in tender protocol, short- term contingency planning in high risk areas and expanding shipboard security plans to include 'refugee action plans' and 'resident stay behind protocol' (a lesser priority item for now).



## WHY MARITIME TERRORISM IS A CERTAINTY

- ISIS now sees the utility in instituting sea-based attacks as a means of overcoming tight security measures on land. The overall latitude of action on the world's oceans remains prevalent, offering extremists the opportunity to move, hide and strike in a manner not possible in a land-based attack.
- Since September 11, international pressure on countries to invest in territorial homeland security initiatives has left coastal defense initiatives of these same countries severely lacking. Italy is a case in point.
- These aforementioned voids are of particular interest to ISIS as they look for new operational environments that are most conducive to their current asset base, while at the same time diversifying from their land-based terror initiatives.
- Today, ISIS has mariner skills stemming from the recruitment of displaced al-Shabab seafarers given the decrease in piracy activity due to virtually all ships having armed security. ISIS has access to assault and transport boats, the ability to mount and sustain maritime operations and familiarity with certain specialist capabilities such as surface and underwater demolition techniques (see February 15 VTR).
- ISIS's vast footprint of land- and sea-based assets is in most part as a result of Italy's billion dollar investment in Libya's oil sector over the past years, assets now in the able and diabolical hands of ISIS.



## WHY THE WORLD IS A PRIME TARGET

- High profile ships, such as yours, constitute an attractive target that directly resonates with the underlying ideological and operational rationale of Salafi-Jihadists as our Ship;
  - **1.** Caters to a large number of persons whom are confined to a single geographic space (which makes an ideal venue for assaults intended to maximize human casualties);
  - **2.** Is highly iconic in nature, reflecting Western materialism, affluence and discretionary spending to which Islamic extremists are opposed; and
  - **3.** An overwhelming majority of passengers and crew are of Judeo-Christian background, which means that an attack can be carried out with little or no risk of affecting wider Muslim interests prevalent in North Africa land-based attacks.
- On a more general level, a decisive strike against your shipping interests would most certainly result in a global CNN effect. Generating this type of publicity is critical to the dynamics of any terrorist entity, not least in the case of ISIS as they can readily exploit to demonstrate operational success, which is vital in their ongoing recruiting efforts and boosting the morale of existing troops (see February VTR for more detail).
- The March 2015 attack in Tunisia already substantiates this high profile focus on cruise ship passengers as the terrorist cell had spotters at the port with surveillance trained on the charter buses transporting tourists representing the aforementioned attraction for this type of target profile. The public nature of ship itineraries gives Salafi-Jihadists a very predictable and defenseless target.



## TYPES OF MARITIME THREATS TO YOUR SHIPS

- **Hijacking**  
Similar to the Achille Lauro attack in which a cruise ship is boarded and commandeered while perpetrators hold and potentially injure or kill passengers if demands are not met.
- **Sinking the Ship using a boat-borne IED**  
Similar to the USS Cole and M/V Limburg attacks in which a small boat loaded with high explosives is rammed into a ship and detonated. As noted above, in 2005 an al Qaeda-linked militant, Lu'ai Sakra, was implicated in a strike of this sort against Israeli cruise ships carrying tourists to Turkey.
- **Sinking the Ship with a submersible parasitic device**  
In this type of attack, terrorist divers place a high-explosive device on the hull of a ship in an effort to sink the vessel.
- **Bombing on board the Ship** A suicide bomber boards a ship and detonates a bomb in an effort to kill or injure passengers.
- **Standoff attack on the Ship using heavy artillery** Similar to the pirate attack on the Seabourn Spirit in 2005, perpetrators attack a ship from land or boat using grenade launchers, mortars, or shoulder fired missiles in an effort to kill or injure passengers.
- **Biological attack on the Ship's food &/or water supply** With anticipated consequences similar to the Norwalk virus outbreak on the Mariner of the Seas, in this scenario, terrorists contaminate a ship's food or water supply with a biological weapon.

## YOUR SHIP'S VULNERABILITIES

- Maritime security checks are much less stringent than those of commercial aviation. There is no metal detector being used and less than 2% of luggage is inspected after x-ray. In terms of arriving tenders when at anchor, no bags, backpacks or shopping bags belonging to crew and contractors are x-rayed, nor inspected by hand.
- Service employees need to undergo more thorough background checks and analysis of countries visited on their passports (both current and previous passport books). Otherwise, it only takes one employee to succumb to a bribe or other form of subversion to offer terrorists a conduit by which to smuggle weapons, biological weapons or explosives on board. Hence the need for the aforementioned stronger security checks.
- When anchored offshore (especially overnight), the Ship is exposed in two ways:
  - **1.** Exposure to explosive laden suicide craft on fast approach; and
  - **2.** Tenders to a from the Ship can be hijacked and used to board the Ship by terrorists or simply detonate explosives from 3-5 backpacks as the tender comes alongside tender gate. Example: On February 27, 2004, terrorists detonated less than 5kg of TNT (costing \$400) and partially sank Superferry 14. Killing 116, wounding over 300 and getting widespread press coverage in the process. Low cost, high casualty.
- The Ship, based on our previous recommendation a few years ago, no longer published the exact dates of its itinerary on its website. However, it still publishes the month and year, and still gives terrorists a predictable time frame for actual visits to ports of call. This information constitutes a highly valuable source of intelligence for terrorists, allowing a perpetrating group to pick the time and place for ease of covert action and



## OUR SHIP'S VULNERABILITIES (CONTINUED)

transfer of explosives and operatives to a targeted vessel or at the point in which the Ship will be most susceptible to a mid-sea assault. Though this does not differ from cruise ships, it does provide information that unnecessarily contributes to our vulnerability for an attack nonetheless. Such advanced knowledge, when keenly exploited, would help to offset greatly the major uncertainty that is normally associated with terrorist attack planning and logistics.

- A compromised crew member or "guest" could easily smuggle plastic explosives onboard (i.e. C4) as it is both hard to detect and highly malleable in nature (which means it can be broken down and repackaged in everyday items unlikely to raise suspicions).
- A series of random killings or hostage-takings could also be staged, using either basic weapons that are accessible on board (for example, knives stolen from kitchen galleys) or more lethal sub machine guns and pistols that had already been pre-deployed by co-opted members of the crew.
- Similarly, a crew member could carry out localized acts of arson in areas where fire doors are absent or where sprinkle systems and alarms had first been disabled.
- Finally, various biological assaults might be possible, ranging from high-tech releases of airborne viruses (weaponized anthrax) through a ship's ventilation system, to more rudimentary (and, therefore, arguably more probable) disseminations of foodborne contaminants such as salmonella, E. Coli, botulinum toxin, and mercury.





## UC GLOBAL'S THREAT MATRIX


- UC Global's Threat Matrix is an index which specifies where to allocate resources based on three main components:
- **Probability of an Attack based on Enemy Capabilities and Intent**
- **Consequences of an Attack (Human & Property Losses)**
- **Mitigation Costs**
- The UC Global Threat Matrix is based on logarithmic scales that account for losses versus enemy intent/capabilities and level of Ship vulnerability. The end result is a management tool to determine which risks are acceptable in order to focus on other more critical threats. This Threat Matrix provides a quantitative and rational base to determine what action to take (and at what cost) versus which risks are acceptable (and at what potential cost). This takes into account immediate and known threats, as well as threats as a result of accidents, negligence or sabotage.
- The size of the colored circles represent the mitigation cost amount. **Red** are independent, and **Blue** are overlapping, costs.





## SHIPS THREAT MATRIX

- Assessment of terrorist intent, capability and recent Tunisia attack as it relates to these 6 types of attacks determines the relative probability of an actual attack. Your Ships are attractive for terrorists since there is potential to kill large numbers of people, cause hundreds of millions in damage, as well as to elicit considerable media attention by attacking such a highly visible and symbolic targets.



## EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES

### HUMAN LOSSES OF SEVERAL DOZEN

- Ram with IED
- On Board Bomb
- Parasitic Bomb
- Standoff Artillery

### HUMAN LOSSES IN THE HUNDREDS

- Hijacking
- Food/Water Contamination

### ECONOMIC LOSSES OVER \$100MM

- Ram with IED
- On Board Bomb
- Parasitic Bomb
- Standoff Artillery

### ECONOMIC LOSSES OVER \$250MM

- Hijacking
- Food/Water Contamination

- Human losses can include residents, guests, contractors, management and crew. It is important to note that there will be substantial injuries that are serious in nature that are a separate issue.
- Economic losses are everything from hull damage to data loss. It does not include the increase in security (physical and strategic) after the fact, which is a double digit multiple of what security mitigation costs are with a proactive strategy.
- Additional economic consequences may result from costs of response and potentially higher insurance rates following terrorist events. The former expenditures would include emergency response, medical and public health services, and decontamination as required.





## CIVIL LIABILITY WITHIN MARITIME TERRORISM

- This liability is qualitatively very different from our preceding analysis of terrorism risk, and it can be equally as costly. At heart, liability is a policy mechanism by government for responding to injuries/fatalities and shifting related costs from one party to another. Government's talk about their 'responses' to terrorism in the news, but in reality, shifting of liability to owners/management (duty of care) in order to compensate victims is how they 'respond'. After all, collecting damages from terrorists is impossible.
- In essence, civil liability is what incentivizes private sector firms to hedge their financial risks, hence passing part of the risk to insurance companies, whom then spread the risk by underwriting with other vessels.
- Civil liability involves a very complex system of rules for determining whether, and to what extent, the victims will be compensated. In essence, any terrorist attack on your Ships will end with wrongful death and personal injury suits in perhaps more than one jurisdiction and ruled upon with very little case precedent. Land based negligence and criminal third party acts statutes are not readily transferable to sea based incidents.
- The aforementioned makes gauging the losses related to these types of cases impossible to accurately quantify as lack of precedent and ambiguous case law for maritime application will undoubtedly result in very different rulings for similar cases, in differing jurisdictions.
- What is certain is that wrongful death and personal injury cases for terrorism related attacks will focus on how defendants (i.e. management) could have arguably prevented or mitigated the attack through appropriate precautions. If such an attack were to result in mass casualties, the liability implications may be unsurvivable for a private owner.

## U.S. CIVIL LIABILITY (MARITIME TERRORISM)

- When terrorists target high profile U.S. based assets, the custodians and owners of those assets will themselves become defendants in civil litigation on the theory that those parties have a duty (of care) to prevent or mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks.
- Liability problems associated with maritime terrorism are especially complicated as maritime operations often involve intricate operations between multiple business entities that may share responsibility for a MV and that owe contractual obligations to each other. In essence, they all become defendants in a U.S. based case.
- One unique aspect of U.S. law concerning maritime activities is that under the U.S. Constitution, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty matters. This is important as plaintiffs in admiralty disputes are automatically entitled to bring their claims to federal court, likely entitling them to a jury trial and governed by maritime U.S. common law precedents. Without examining all the legal possibilities in detail, we simply note that U.S. jurisdiction over a maritime terrorist event will undoubtedly yield additional, and very substantial, legal costs and liability exposure.
- For example, under the federal Jones Act, a seaman possesses the right to recover damages against his or her employer for negligence resulting in personal injury or death. Related claims under the Jones Act turn on detailed legal definitions of who qualifies as a “seaman,” what qualifies as a “vessel,” and who constitutes an “employer” for purposes of the act. Where a claim under the Jones Act can be made, the seaman (or the seaman’s beneficiary) is entitled to a jury trial, and some of the standards for negligence claims that apply under the act are more liberal than those that would typically apply on land.



## LIMITS OF U.S.-BASED JURISDICTION

- The general rule regarding police and jurisdiction on the high seas is (1) that it cannot be arbitrarily imposed by a state on a foreign flagged vessel and (2) that the flag state ordinarily retains sole jurisdiction and regulatory authority over its own flagged vessels while they operate on the high seas.
- As a threshold matter, some terrorist attacks on passenger vessels can fall entirely outside the jurisdictional bounds of U.S. legal authority and are unlikely to be subject to U.S. civil liability rules. For example, (1) a terrorist attack on our Bahamian flagged vessel, (2) occurring in the internal waters of a foreign state, and (3) without any involvement by U.S. nationals as passengers or crew. In general, a terrorist attack that has no connection to the United States whatsoever (as with the 3 instances of the above hypothetical attack) would not be subject to U.S. laws or jurisdiction. It would instead be addressed through the legal rules and authority of the sovereign state in which the attack takes place.
- UC Global assists with non-security related risk mitigation and can provide valuable insight to legal counsel in order to jointly create crew scheduling strategies in high risk areas in order to limit U.S. jurisdictional exposure in mitigating the vast claims liability risk briefly mentioned on page 14.

## INTELLIGENCE AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

### URGENT DECISION POINTS

- **Voyage Threat Report (VTR)** Management approval necessary to move ahead with 12 month subscription of monthly VTR's in same format as Feb 15 VTR (without one time Salafi Jihadist analysis).
- **Route Plan Westward beginning in Greece** In order to conduct a tabletop risk assessment as to this short, but high risk voyage, and what type of security support will be needed, including the lease of additional Kit specifically for the Mediterranean.
- **Refugee at Sea Protocol Plan** Referring to April 8 Memorandum for immediate drafting of contingency plan and ensuring adequate supplies, personnel and logistics can be immediately deployed for this contingency. Also discuss what type of security support will be needed.

### SECONDARY DECISION POINTS

- **Resident Leave Behind Contingency** In the event it would be necessary for the Ship to depart port and a Resident had to be left behind (i.e. illness, lost, kidnap, etc.) the Ship needs to have a contingency plan and approved protocol in place in order to avoid potential liability (especially in the case of U.S. nationals- see page 14). This is especially critical when in countries that are in a state of internal conflict (i.e. Egypt and Mrs. Planett situation). A Contingency Plan & Protocol created by UC Global in conjunction with Management and its in house Counsel may serve as the foundation for releases that insulate Management from liability.





**MARSEC MANAGEMENT**

## David Morales

Director Maritime  
Spec Ops



Within UC Global's MarSec Division, David Morales handles logistics and security needs (on- and off-shore) for Spain's largest commercial fishing fleets operating in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, superyachts belonging to members of the Forbes 100 list, executive and diplomatic protection throughout Europe, logistical needs of Spain's Naval fleet operations throughout the Mediterranean.

David Morales began his military career in 1991 in Spain's Infantería de Marina and shortly thereafter assigned to their Special Operations Unit within the 3rd Special Operations Group known as TEAR (Spain's Navy SEAL's) whereby he earned designations in basic and freefall parachutist and later designated a HALO / HAHO specialist. The Infantería de Marina, or Spanish Naval Marines, is a corps within the Spanish Navy responsible for providing amphibious warfare from the sea utilizing naval platforms and resources. It is fully integrated into the Spanish Navy Structure. The Corps was formed in 1537 by Carlos I of Spain, making it the oldest marine corps in the world, drawing from the Compañías Viejas del Mar de Nápoles. The Spanish Navy Marines is an elite corps, highly specialized in amphibious warfare. Its ability to embark on a short term notice at (Sea, Air and Land) makes it a unit with a high strategic value. Mr. Morales is also an Underwater Demolitions Specialist, an Expert Tracker and commanded numerous shipboard assault teams.

During his illustrious career, he operated extensively in conflicts throughout Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. In these theatres of operations he conducted intelligence gathering, counterterrorism, and counter human trafficking operations. Throughout his career he conducted countless operations in maritime interdiction, search & rescue of downed pilots (Bosnia), human intelligence gathering and dignitary protection.

Mr. Morales was also a SEAL Instructor specializing in underwater demolitions, land-based demolitions, close quarters battle, cartography, land navigation, tracking, mountain operations, maritime interdiction, intelligence and counter intelligence, aerial and maritime assaults and motorcade operations.





## APPENDIX

## HIGH PROFILE MARITIME TERRORIST EVENTS

Incident	Group	Deaths	Remarks
Hijacking of <i>Santa Maria</i> (1961)	Portuguese and Spanish rebels	N/A	The <i>Santa Maria</i> , a 21,000-ton cruise ship owned by Companhia Colonial of Lisbon, was hijacked by a group of 70 men led by Captain Henriques Galvao (a Portuguese political exile) to bring global attention to the Estado Novo in Portugal and related fascist regime in Spain. The vessel was on a holiday cruise in the southern Caribbean and its more than 600 passengers were held for 11 days before Galvao formally surrendered to the Brazilian navy. The incident constitutes the first modern-day hijack at sea. <sup>a</sup>
Use of a Cypriot-registered coaster, <i>Claudia</i> , to transport weapons to Ireland (1973)	Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)	N/A	<i>Claudia</i> was intercepted by the Irish Navy while attempting to land a consignment of weapons intended for PIRA. On board were five tons of munitions that included 250 Soviet-made assault rifles, pistols, mines, grenades, and explosives. The vessel was owned by Gunther Leinhauser, a West German arms trafficker, which said that PIRA had given him a "shopping list" of required materiel and that the "order" had been filled by Libya (Wilkinson, 1986, p. 39).
Hijacking of <i>Achille Lauro</i> (1985)	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	1	Cruise ship hijacked in an attempt to coerce the release of 50 Palestinians being held in Israel. The perpetrators were eventually detained in Sicily. Person killed was Leon Kling-hoffer, a German, wheelchair-bound tourist, who was captured by the world's media as he was pushed overboard. <sup>b</sup>
Targeting of cruise ships on the Nile River (1992–1994)	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	N/A	The group targeted at least four cruise ships during these two years as part of its general effort to undermine the Egyptian tourist sector (a key contributor to the country's economy) (Sinai, 2004, p. 50; Sitalides, 1998).
Hijacking of a Turkish passenger ferry in the Black Sea (1996)	Chechen rebels	N/A	Nine rebel gunmen held 255 passengers hostage for four days during which they threatened to blow up the captured ferry in order to bring international attention to the Chechen cause; the abductors eventually sailed the vessel back to Istanbul where they surrendered. <sup>c</sup>



## HIGH PROFILE MARITIME TERRORIST EVENTS

Incident	Group	Deaths	Remarks
Suicide bombing of the USS <i>Cole</i> (2000)	Al Qaeda	19	The bombing took place while the <i>Cole</i> was refueling at the Yemeni port of Aden. The assault involved 600 pounds of C4 explosive that was packed into the hull of a suicide attack skiff. Those killed were 17 U.S. sailors, 2 terrorists. In addition to the 17 sailors who were killed, another 39 were injured. <sup>d</sup>
Suicide bombing of the M/V <i>Limburg</i> (2002) <sup>e</sup>	Al Qaeda	3	The attack involved a small, fiberglass boat packed with 100–200 kg of TNT rammed into the tanker as it was preparing to take on a pilot-assisted approach to the Ash Shihr Terminal off the coast of Yemen. The <i>Limburg</i> was lifting 297,000 barrels of crude at the time of the strike, an estimated 50,000 of which spilled into the waters surrounding the stricken vessel. Those killed were 1 crewman and 2 terrorists.
Use of <i>Karine A</i> to Palestinian transport weapons Authority (PA) for anti-Israeli strikes (2002)		N/A	<i>Karine A</i> , a 4,000-ton freighter, was seized in the Red Sea on January 3, 2002. The vessel was carrying a wide assortment of Russian and Iranian arms, including Katyusha rockets (with a 20-kilometer range), antitank missiles (LAW and Sagger), long-range mortar bombs, mines, sniper rifles, ammunition, and more than two tons of high explosives. The US\$100 million weapon consignment was linked directly to Yasir Arafat and was allegedly to be used for attacks against Jewish targets in Israel and the Occupied Territories ("IDF Seizes PA Weapons Ship," 2002).
Hijacking of the M/V <i>Penrider</i> , a fully laden shipping fuel oil tanker from Singapore to Penang in northern Malaysia (2003)	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)	N/A	This is one of the few instances where GAM has directly claimed responsibility for a maritime attack. The group took three hostages (the master, chief engineer, and second engineer), who were eventually released after a \$52,000 ransom was paid. <sup>f</sup>

## HIGH PROFILE MARITIME TERRORIST EVENTS

Incident	Group	Deaths	Remarks
Use of the <i>Abu Hassan</i> , an Egyptian-registered fishing trawler, to transport weapons and training manuals to assist militant strikes in Israel	Lebanese Hezbollah	N/A	The Egyptian owner of the trawler was recruited by Hezbollah and trained specifically to carry out maritime support missions. The vessel, which Israeli naval commandos intercepted 35 nautical miles off Rosh Hanikra near Haifa, was being used to ferry a complex weapon and logistics consignment, consisting of fuses for 122mm Qassam rockets, electronic time-delay fuses, a training video for carrying out suicide strikes, and two sets of CD-ROMs containing detailed bomb-making information (Herbert-Burns, 2005, p. 166).
Attacks against the Khawr Al Amaya oil terminal (KAAOT) and Al Basrah oil terminal (ABOT), Iraq (2004)	Jamaat al-Tawhid	3	The attacks were claimed by al Zarqawi as a follow-up to the 2000 <i>Cole</i> and 2002 <i>Limburg</i> strikes (using the same small-craft, suicide modality) and appeared to be part of an overall strategy of destabilization in Iraq (the terminals were shut down for two days, costing nearly US\$40 million in lost revenues) (Warouw, 2005, p. 12; Köknar, 2005).
Bombing of the Philippine <i>SuperFerry 14</i> (2004)	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), combined with elements from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Rajah Soliaman Revolutionary Movement (RSRM) <sup>9</sup>	116	Attack involved 20 sticks of dynamite that were planted in a hollowed-out television set. The bomb set off a fire that quickly spread throughout the ship due to the lack of an effective internal sprinkler system. Of the 116 fatalities, 63 have been identified (at the time of writing) and 53 remain unaccounted for. The incident has been listed as the most destructive act of terrorism in maritime history and the fourth most serious international incident since September 11, 2001 (anonymous Anti-Terrorism Task Force officials, 2005).



## HIGH PROFILE MARITIME TERRORIST EVENTS

Incident	Group	Deaths	Remarks
Suicide attack against the Port of Ashdod, Israel (2004)	Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade	10	The attack took place at Ashdod, one of Israel's busiest seaports, and involved two Palestinian suicide bombers from Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. The perpetrators had apparently been smuggled to the terminal inside a commercial container four hours before the operation. Some speculation remains that al Qaeda assisted with logistics of the strike (Kökner, 2005).

<sup>a</sup> Jenkins et al. (1986, p. 69); "Santa Maria Hijacking" (undated). The hijacking was also known as "Operation Dulcinea" by the hijackers.

<sup>b</sup> The PLF's original intention was to seize the *Achille Lauro* and then ram it into the Israeli oil terminal at Ashdod. However, the attack team was discovered before this operation could be put into effect, forcing a change in plan (anonymous security and terrorism analyst, 2005).

<sup>c</sup> Sinai (2004, p. 50); Sitalides (1998); Kökner (2005); "Hostage Taking Action by Pro-Chechen Rebels Impairs Turkey's Image" (2001). Allegedly the gunmen had also considered blowing up one of the two suspension bridges that cross the Bosphorus to close the Strait to traffic.

<sup>d</sup> For more on this incident, see Perl and O'Rourke (2001).

<sup>e</sup> The *M/V Limburg* has since been renamed and now operates under the designation *M/V Maritime Jewel* (anonymous International Maritime Bureau personnel and Maritime Intelligence Group analyst, 2005).

<sup>f</sup> Herbert-Burns (2005, pp. 167–168). See also McGeown (2003) and International Maritime Organization (2003).

<sup>g</sup> JI is an Indonesia-based jihadist group that has been linked to al Qaeda and allegedly seeks the creation of a pan-regional Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia. It has been held responsible for several high-profile attacks in the region, including the 2002 Bali bombings (which collectively killed 198 people and remains the single most deadly international terrorist attack since September 11, 2001), suicide strikes on the U.S.-owned Marriott Hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta between 2003 and 2004 (with a combined toll of 17 deaths and 248 injuries), and coordinated attacks against tourist hubs, again in Bali, in 2005 (32 killed, over 100 wounded). For two excellent overviews of the group's origins and terrorist activities, see ICG (2002, 2003). The RSRM is a highly fanatical fringe element of Balik Islam, a Philippines-based movement composed of Christian converts to Islam. The group has been linked to both JI and ASG and seeks to replace the existing administration in Manila with a Muslim theocracy to purge what it regards as the artificial influx of Catholic influences first introduced by the Spanish and then consolidated under the Americans (anonymous antiterrorism and intelligence officials, 2005). See also Villaviray (2003) and "Summary of Report" (2004).